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not be encouraged to join the corporation's counsel as a party defendant. Corporate counsel would not be forced to reveal confidential
information. In fact, had the court of appeals affirmed the lower
court's decision, attorneys in Goldberg's position would not be allowed
to disclose these confidences and secrets. This reaffirmation of the
confidentiality between attorney and client would allay any fear on the
part of the corporate client that its counsel would be forced to reveal
confidential information. This in turn would result in greater disclosure of information to the investing public since corporate counsel
would have better access to and a greater knowledge of the facts
relevant to the issuance of the corporation's securities.
Although, the actual effect of the Meyerhofer decision is not yet
known, it has been shown that it is likely to be inconsistent with the
policy that the court was attempting to promote. It is submitted that at
the very least the court of appeals in its opinion should have addressed
itself to these potential consequences of its holding.
HOWARD B. POSSICK

PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST PRIORITY UNDER
§ 9-312(4) OF THE U.C.C.: FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
REWRITES THE CODE*
American National Bank of Jacksonville on April 8, 1969, executed a loan agreement with Machek Farms and took back a security
interest which encumbered all equipment thereafter acquired by
Machek Farms.' The bank filed a financing statement on April 10,
1969.2 Subsequently, Machek Farms purchased farm equipment from
Florida Truck on August 8, 1969, and executed a credit sales agreement to cover the entire purchase price of the equipment. Florida
Truck assigned this credit sales contract to International Harvester
Credit Corporation, which filed a financing statement on September 3,
1969. 3 After Machek Farms defaulted in payments owed to both
creditors, i.e., American National Bank and International Harvester,
Florida Truck repossessed the farm equipment. American National
* Florida adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (1962 version) effective Jan., 1, 1967.
FLA. STAT. chs. 671-80 (1973). [The Uniform Commercial Code will hereinafter be cited as
U.C.C. or the Code.]
1. U.C.C. section 9-204 validates after-acquired property as collateral for a loan. Section
9-204(3) states in pertinent part, "a security agreement may provide that collateral whenever
acquired shall secure all obligations covered by the security agreement." Section 9-204(4) limits
the application of an after-acquired clause.
2. U.C.C. section 9-302 requires a financing statement to be filed to perfect all security
interests with some exceptions stated in subsection (1).
3. By not filing until September 3, 1969, International Harvester did not take advantage of a
special exception to the "first to file, first in right" rule in U.C.C. section 9-312(4), regarding
purchase money security interests in collateral other than inventory. U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
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Bank filed an action in replevin against Florida Truck and International Harvester to recover the farm equipment. The trial court,
seeking a construction of the applicable Code provisions, certified the
question of priority between the conflicting perfected security interests
to the District Court of Appeal, First District. 4 The First District held
that since the vendor, Florida Truck, and its assignee, International
Harvester, failed to perfect the purchase money security interest
within the ten-day grace period specified in U.C.C. section 9-312(4),
the purchase money security interest should be treated as any other
security interest, and therefore, under the "first to file" rule, American
National Bank had priority rights to the farm equipment. 5 The District Court of Appeal then certified the question of priority between the
conflicting perfected security interests for review by .the Supreme
Court of Florida. The Supreme Court of Florida held, affirmed in
part, reversed in part: The security interest in after-acquired property
has priority over the delinquently-perfected purchase money security
interest only to the extent of the debtor's equity in the after-acquired
farm equipment. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American
Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974).
The Florida Legislature, in adopting section 9-312 of the U.C.C.,
has set forth rules governing priority with regard to conflicting perfected security interests in the same collateral. Generally, the first
secured party to perfect his interest by filing a financing statement
gains priority. 6 The U.C.C. makes a specific exception to this general
rule of priority, however, by giving priority to a purchase money
security interest over other security interests in the same collateral; yet, this priority exists only if this purchase money interest in collateral
other than inventory is perfected by filing within 10 days after the
debtor takes possession of the goods sold.7 Thus the priority of the
4. The circuit court, in addition, certified another question:
(1) Under Florida Statute 679.302(1)(c), must a seller of farm equipment file a financing
statement to perfect his security interest in farm equipment sold under one contract
when the purchase price of each item is less than $2,500.00, but the total amount of the
contract for all items exceeds $2,500.00?
The district court answered in the affirmative. American Nat'l Bank v. International Harvester
Credit Corp., 269 So.2d 726, 731 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). The court claimed that the Code
provision, which provides that a financing statement need not be filed to perfect "a purchase
money security interest in farm equipment having a purchase price not in excess of $2500,"
required a filing when the total value of the transaction exceeds $2500. On review, the Supreme
Court of Florida reversed the district court as to this question and required filing only when the
price of the specific item itself exceeded $2500. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American
Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974). The supreme court's holding is questionable, but since the
question may become moot if Florida adopts the 1972 version of the U.C.C. section 9-302, which
omits any value requirement, no further discussion will be made.
5. American Nat'l Bank v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 269 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1972).
6. U.C.C. section 9-312(5) states in part, "priority between conflicting security interests in
the same collateral shall be determined according to the following: (a) in the order of filing if both
are perfected by filing . .. ."
7. U.C.C. section 9-312(4) states:
A purchase money security interest . . . has priority over a conflicting security interest
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purchase money security interest is conditioned upon prompt and
public notice of the existence of that interest by compliance with the
ten-day filing requirement of section 9-312(4).8
The Supreme Court of Florida in InternationalHarvester misconstrued section 9-312(4). Although the court properly held that American National Bank had priority since it was the first to file and the
grace period to file the purchase money security interest had expired,
the court limited the bank's priority to the extent of Machek Farm's
equity in the farm equipment. To determine the debtor's equity, the
court reasoned, the debt owed to International Harvester would have
to be satisfied first through the proceeds from the foreclosure sale of
the equipment. After International Harvester was paid, the remaining
proceeds-the debtor's equity-would go to American National Bank.
In essence, since International Harvester was paid first, it had priority
even though it failed to perfect its purchase money interest within the
time limits specified in the U.C.C. This holding, in effect, gives an
absolute priority to all purchase money interests over conflicting perfected security interests regardless of the time of filing, since the
determination of the debtor's equity depends on the purchase money
interests' being paid first. The Supreme Court of Florida appeared to
adhere to the U.C.C., but the use of the debtor's equity limitation
enabled the court to avoid the Code's proper application.
The court reached its conclusion to limit the priority to the
debtor's equity by incorrectly mixing title theory with the law of
security interests under the U.C.(. The court reasoned that since
International Harvester reserved the title to the farm equipment, the
earlier security in after-acquired property could be attached only to the
debtor's "interest" in the equipment under the credit sales contract.
Therefore, the purchase money interest of International Harvester was
entitled to priority and the earlier creditor was limited to any proceeds
remaining after International Harvester was satisfied. 9 The court's
incorrect reliance on title theory for the development of the debtors
equity limitation completely disregards other sections of the U.C.C.
Under the Code, contrary to the holding in InternationalHarvester, the buyer of equipment under a credit sales contract does not
obtain an equity interest-he acquires the property.1 ° The seller retains only a security interest.'
. . . if the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives
possession of the collateral or within 10 days thereafter (emphasis added).
8. E.g., Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. App. 1968);
Henson, Priorities under the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 N.D.L. REV. 425 (1966); Smith,
Article Nine: Secured Transaction-Perfectionand Priorities, 44 N.C.L. REV. 753 (1966).
9. 296 So. 2d at 34. The court held that "[t]here really are no conflicting security interests in
this situation." The court found that the seller has retained an interest in the property and the
earlier creditor has an interest in any equity that the debtor might have in the goods purchased.
10. U.C.C. section 2-401(1) states in part, "Any retention or reservation by the seller of the
title . . . in the goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a
security interest.
... (Emphasis added.)
11. Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen, Inc., 25 Conn. Supp. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (Super. Ct.
1964).

CASES NOTED
The Code defines a security interest as an interest in personal
property which secures payment. The Code further states that a reservation of title by the seller is limited to a security interest. 12 Therefore,
International Harvester retained only a security interest in the farm
equipment, notwithstanding its reservation of title. In allowing the
seller a reservation of title greater than a security interest, the majority
rejected the Code's explicit definition of security interest in addition to
incorrectly applying the concept of title.
Further, the drafters of the Code intended that the concept of title
be ignored in determining priority among conflicting security interests.
The Code specifically states that the priority of security interests is in
no way affected by which party holds title to the goods. 13 The general
intent of the Code, as expressed by the comments to section 9-312,
clearly demands that the provisions regarding the priority between
conflicting security interests should not be circumvented by manipulation of the locus of title. 14 The court, by relying entirely on locus of
title and thus contradicting this expressed intent of the Code, clearly
misconstrued section 9-312(4).
One reason underlying the incorrect holding in InternationalHarvester is a general aversion to security interests in after-acquired
property. IS If this was the court's rationale, it was totally unjustified.
The U.C.C. specifically recognizes the validity of security interests in
after-acquired property,' 6 and does not limit those interests to the
extent of the debtor's equity.
For a correct application of the Code, a determination of which
party held the title to the farm equipment would be immaterial.
American National Bank's security interest in after-acquired property
should have attached as soon as the farm equipment was delivered to
Machek Farms. 17 American National Bank's perfected security interest would then have been superior to any later perfected interest
except a purchase money security interest perfected within the ten-day
grace period. 18 Since International Harvester did not perfect its pur12. U.C.C. § 1-201(37). The added fact that the transaction was a conditional contract sale
is irrelevant. The Code specifically applies if the parties intended to create a security interest,
regardless of the manner used. U.C.C. § 9-102(I)(a).
13. U.C.C. § 9-202 states, "Each provision of this Article with regard to rights, obligations
and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor." See, e.g.,
Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1972).
14. U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 3; See also Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARV.
L. REv. 1333 (1963).
15. 296 So. 2d at 40 (Carlton, C.J., dissenting).
16. U.C.C. Section 9-204(3) validates the use of a security interest in after-acquired property; Section 9-204(4) prohibits after-acquired interest in consumer goods and crops. For pre-Code
recognition, see Rose v. Lurton Co., 111 Fla. 424, 149 So. 557 (1933). The restriction on such
security interest to the debtor's equity is a new concept which is inconsistent with Article 9 of the
U.C.C. and pre-Code law.
17. E.g., National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., Inc., 191 N.E.2d 471 (Mass.
1963).
18. U.C.C. § 9-312(4); R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTION UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 78 (1973); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 903-21
(1972).
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chase money security interest within the ten-day period, American
National Bank should have prevailed as the first to have filed. Contrary to the holding in InternationalHarvester, this interpretation is
the way the Code was designed to work in Florida. 19
The court's decision must be viewed as one which destroys the
business value of inventory and blanket equipment loan financing.
Generally, a creditor, secured by an interest in the debtor's afteracquired property, would loan additional funds against the newly
acquired equipment after he was satisfied that no purchase money
security interest had been perfected within ten days after the debtor
took possession of the new equipment. As a result of International
Harvester, a lender in Florida will not be able to determine whether a
purchase money security interest has been perfected, since the ten-day
filing requirement will be ignored by the court.2 0 If the lender decides
to advance additional funds on the strength of the security interest in
after-acquired property, he faces the obvious risk of being second in
priority to a later-perfected purchase money security interest even
though this latter interest was filed after the ten-day grace period.
Since the risk outweighs any benefit to the lender, his choice will be
not to finance on the basis of the after-acquired property clause. 2 ' The
only alternative way in Florida for the lender to protect himself would
be to reperfect his interest each time an advance is made to that
debtor. This result would be a disaster for modern-day inventory and
equipment loan financing, which depend heavily on after-acquired
property clauses.
The holding in International Harvester conflicts with the decisions reached by every other appellate court and legal scholar that has
considered the same question.22 In each situation the priority problem
was resolved by rationale similar to that suggested by Professor Henson:
If a seller . . . advancing the funds for the purchase of goods
fails to file within ten days after the debtor [buyer] receives
the goods, the purchase money priority is lost and priority
will be determined according to the rules of Section 9-312(5).
19. 296 So. 2d at 42 (Carlton, C.J., dissenting).
20. Compare North Platte State Bank v. Production Credit Ass'n, 189 Neb. 44, 200 N.W.2d
1 (1972); see generally Meek, Secured Transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code, 18 ARK.
L. REV. 30 (1964).
21. See Automated Bookbinding Serv., Inc. v. Hans Mueller Corp., 471 F.2d 546 (4th Cir.
1972); but see Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States, 431 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1970).

22. The cases that have decided the same issue contrary to the Florida conclusion are:
Automated Bookbinding Serv., Inc. v. Hans Mueller Corp., 471 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1972);
Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. App. 1968); National Cash

Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 191 N.E.2d 471 (Mass. 1963); Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l
Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1972); North Platte State Bank v. Production Credit Ass'n, 189
Neb. 44, 200 N.W.2d 1 (1972); Recchio v. Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co., 55 Misc. 2d
788, 286 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1968); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. National Cash
Register Co., 473 P.2d 234 (Okl. 1970).

CASES NOTED
This will usually mean that priority is determined in the
order of filing, so that an earlierfiled financer of equipment
claiming after-acquiredgoods would have priority over a later
23
purchase money financer who did not file within ten days.
Notwithstanding the holding in InternationalHarvester, it is submitted that the above approach is the correct solution for determining the
priority of a delinquently-perfected purchase money security interest.
The only justifications supplied by the court to explain its reordering of security interests under the Code were unspecified "contractual
constitutional requirements and equitable principles." '24 As the dissent
artfully points out, the reasons behind the International Harvester
decision must be found elsewhere. 2 5 The clear error of this holding can
be further illustrated by an analysis of the holding in a subsequent case
which involved the exact issue of purchase money priority.
In James Talcott v. Associates Capital Co., 26 a finance company
secured a loan to a businessman with a fully perfected security interest
in after-acquired property; later, the borrower purchased two tractors
on credit-a classic situation for the operation of section 9-312(4).
Because the seller filed the purchase money security interest beyond
the ten-day grace period, the court held that the finance company had
first claim to the tractors. Presumably, under these facts, Florida
courts would have applied the InternationalHarvester rule and limited the recovery to-the "debtor's equity" in the tractors. It was clear in
Talcott, however, that the holder of the purchaser money security
interest must either satisfy the filing requirements of section 9-312(4) or
lose priority. Since the seller had not satisfied that section, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the finance company,
and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. This holding
is quite a contrast to that of the Supreme Court of Florida but, in the
opinion of this writer, it is the correct one.
The decision in International Harvester is in derogation of the
most important goal of the U.C.C., i.e., to make commercial law
uniform among the states. 27 Justice Carlton clearly portrayed the effect
of this decision in his dissent when he stated that the majority decision
"overrides the legislature . . .by interpreting statutes contrary to the
expressed intent of the legislature, inconsistent with the specific language of the statutes and inconsistent with common sense."'2 8 The
23. R.

HENSON,

SECURED TRANSACTION

UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 78

(1973) (emphasis added).
24. 296 So. 2d at 34. However, as the dissent clearly states, there are no constitutional

restrictions on the legislature's power to enact rules of priority, and therefore the majority erred
by using these "restrictions" as the basis for its holding. 296 So. 2d at 40 (Carlton, C.J.,
dissenting).
25. 296 So. 2d at 40 (Carlton, C.J., dissenting). See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
26. 491 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1974) Ihereinafter referred to as Talcott] (diversity action in which
the court applied the Ohio U.C.C.).
27. U.C.C. § 1-102; 296 So. 2d at 35-36 (Carlton, C.J., dissenting).
28. 296 So. 2d at 37 (Carlton, C.J., dissenting).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

dissent was on point when it stated that the court was simply "legislating an exception to the clear and specific provisions of the Code so as
to make the Code meaningless." '29 The result of the court's misinterpretation of the Code is that while the Florida Uniform Commercial
Code may read like the U.C.C. does in other jurisdictions, it operates
quite differently where a security interest in after-acquired property is
involved. This new Florida rule frustrates the U.C.C. and renders
certain types of loan financing obsolete in Florida. It is urgent that this
decision not be followed in the future.
DONALD FRANCIS SINEX

FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF LOCAL POLITICAL
CORRUPTION: A NEW APPROACH
Should the federal government be allowed to prosecute local
politicians for extorting money from local businessmen, especially if
there is no evidence of force, fear, or threats? Casimir Staszcuk, a
Chicago alderman, accepted three payments of $3,000 each from a
"zoning consultant" on behalf of his clients in return for Staszcuk's
agreement not to oppose their applications for zoning amendments in
the alderman's ward. The federal government charged Staszcuk with
violation of the Hobbs Act,' which contains two alternative definitions
of extortion: the obtaining of property from another, with his consent,
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right. The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, relying solely on
the "color of official right" definition of extortion, convicted Staszcuk.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, affirmed: A
local official accepting money under color of official right, which
activity affects interstate commerce, may be convicted of violating the
Hobbs Act. United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1974).
Before the significance of the color of official right definition of
extortion as contained in the Hobbs Act is discussed, the threshold
29. Id. at 39.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970):
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person
or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right.

